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A HISTORY OF USURY LAW IN ARKANSAS: 1836-1990
Kenneth E. Galchus,*
Charles G. Martin,**

Ashvin P. Vibhakar***
If you lend money to any of my people with you who is poor,
you shall not be to him as a creditor, and you shall not exact interest from him.'
You shall not lend upon interest to your brother, interest on
money, 2interest on victuals, interest on anything that is lent for
interest.
These quotations from the Bible indicate that restrictions on interest rates extend back to biblical times. While interest rate limitations in Arkansas do not extend back quite that far, the controversy
over the need and usefulness of usury laws dates back at least to 1836.
In that year, the first Arkansas legislature passed a law limiting the
amount of interest that could be charged a borrower.3 This legislation
provided:
That the said bank's branches shall not take more than eight per
cent per annum upon any of its loans and discounts; nor shall it
take more than seven per cent per annum on loans or discounts
payable within eight months; nor more than six per cent per annum on any loan or discount, payable within four months after
such loans or discounts.'
Before the Civil War, the customary rate of interest charged on
loans in Arkansas ranged from 6% to 10%, and the rate was generally 10% from 1860 to 1868.1 Although the rate limitations given in
the 1836 legislation were potentially binding, the law had little impact
on banking because no penalties were stated in case excessive interest
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was charged. 6 As a result, usury did not become a significant political
issue until after the Civil War.
Under the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, ex-confederates were denied the right to vote, and Arkansas was placed under military rule
until such time as a new constitution could be approved by voters and
accepted by Congress.7 The constitution drafted by Republicans in
1868 contained a usury provision that differed substantially from the
usury legislation passed in 1836. The new constitution provided that
"[N]o law limiting the rate of interest for which individuals may contract in the State shall ever be passed." 8
Capital shortage was a severe economic problem in the South
under reconstruction. The 1868 usury law, typical of laws passed in
other southern states, was designed to attract outside capital and facilitate redevelopment of the state.
After the new constitution was enacted, Republicans took control of state and local government, and interest rates rose rapidly.
During the 1870s rates of 20% and higher could be found.9 State
finances were soon brought to near bankruptcy by fraudulent public
bond issues which were supported by a large increase in taxes.' ° In
the early 1870s a national depression caused by a widespread banking
panic, which started in New York, wrecked havoc on the state's agricultural economy. When voting rights were restored to ex-confederates in 1873, Democrats won overwhelming support from voters for a
new constitutional convention. The 1868 constitution had become a
symbol for every perceived social and economic ill caused by Republicans in the state. As a result, the Democrats retaliated against the
Republicans and adopted a very rigid constitution--one designed to
curb government power." Although usury was an obscure issue during the 1874 convention, the high interest rates of the 1870s caused
the convention to adopt a very strict usury law: "All contracts for a
greater rate of interest than ten percent per annum shall be void, as to
principal and interest, and the General Assembly shall prohibit the
same by law; but when no rate of interest is agreed upon, the rate
6. Id.
7. Act of Mar. 2, 1967, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867); Act of Mar. 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat.
2 (1867).
8. ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. XV, § 21.
9.

Penick, supra note 3, at 423 (citing

WORTHEN,

at 128).

10. Nunn, The Constitutional Convention of 1874, 27
QUARTERLY 182 (1968).
11. Id. at 203-04.

THE ARKANSAS

HISTORICAL

1989-90]

USURY LAW

shall be six per centum per annum.""
Given the mood of the Democrats, it is not surprising that they
reacted to the problems of Reconstruction as they did. Unfortunately, the retaliatory usury law that was enacted would soon prove
to be incompatible with modem business practices.
As implied by this constitutional provision, the 10% limit did
not vary with the type of loan or its terms. This made the courts' task
of identifying the maximum interest rate allowed by law relatively
easy. It also simplified the process of identifying those contracts containing usurious interest rates. Thus, on one hand, the simplicity with
which this part of the 1874 constitution was stated made this maximum interest rate difficult to evade. On the other hand, the 1874
constitutional provision did not spell out what ancillary charges were
to be considered part of the interest rate nor did it address acceptable
methods for calculating an interest rate. The failure to provide a clear
definition of the interest rate (and the unwillingness to alter the constitutional provision) led to approximately 100 years of litigation
designed to circumvent and, consequently, to define the limits of the
usury provision.
For about seventy-five years, the Arkansas Supreme Court tempered the harsh effects of the 10% usury limit. Although the court
was willing to declare an interest rate usurious when the situation
clearly indicated it, the court at the same time allowed various evasive
charges designed to circumvent the operation of the usury law. For
example, the court condoned various service fees charged to the borrower which were clearly designed to conceal usury.13 The court provided lenders the largest loophole by accepting the argument that
there could be a difference between the time price and the cash price
of merchandise. The difference between these two prices was not considered to be usury so long as the credit price was quoted as part of a
legitimate time sale. This theory, expounded shortly after the 1874
Constitutional Convention, first appeared in the case of Ford v. Hancock.' 4 The court in this case stated, in effect, that the time price
differential would be viewed favorably by the courts as long as the
12. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 13 (1874).
13. See, e.g., Citizens' Bank v. Murphy, 83 Ark. 31, 36, 102 S.W. 697, 699 (1907) (1'/2%
fee for collecting accounts; " 'Usury will not be inferred where from the circumstances the
opposite conclusion can be reasonably and fairly reached'." Id. (quoting First Nat'l Bank v.
Waddell, 74 Ark. 241, 85 S.W. 417 (1905)). See also, Matthews v. Georgia State Savings
Ass'n, 132 Ark. 219, 200 S.W. 130 (1918) (inspection fee and compulsory insurance).
14. 36 Ark. 248 (1880).
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higher credit price was not in consideration for forbearance but rather
was quoted in connection with a legitimate credit sale.
In 1951 the state legislature codified the liberal trend of the Arkansas usury decisions by passing the Arkansas Installment Loan
Law. 5 This Act, directed principally at those making small loans,
merely restated what the court had said in its long line of cases dealing with the usury issue;' 6 that is, the Act provided lenders a way to
circumvent the 10% usury limit. This was done by allowing lenders
to collect from borrowers various fees that were not to be characterized as interest. These charges were for such things as credit investigations, inspections, closing costs, and title insurance.17 The
allowable charges also included fees paid an attorney for legal services
rendered in connection with the loan.' 8 Such charges, however, were
to bear a reasonable relation to the service rendered. The Act provided a maximum fee schedule that depended on the principal amount
of the contract. 9
This codification of past, liberal court decisions regarding usury,
however, soon proved to be one of the causes of the Act's demise.2 °
The Act attracted the attention of many who had been unaware of the
court's liberal trend on the usury issue. Thus, passage of this act led
to a reconsideration of the whole usury issue once again.
After the state legislature's stamp of approval of this liberal
trend, the reaction of the national finance companies was swift. Numerous finance companies were immediately opened to take advantage of the newly codified loopholes in the state usury law. During
the one year in which the Act was effective (before being declared
unconstitutional), over thirty thousand small loans were made with
the total loan amount exceeding eight million dollars. 2 ' It is easy to
see why it was advantageous for finance companies to establish offices
in Arkansas. The number and variety of allowed service charges provided finance companies an effective way to circumvent the Arkansas
15. Arkansas Installment Loan Law, 1951 Ark. Acts 203 (repealed 1953).
16. The law was specifically directed at lenders making loans of less than $2500 and excluded banks, building and loan associations, and others who were already under state
supervision.
17. 1951 Ark. Acts 203, § 27 (repealed 1953).
18. Id.
19. Total charges were not to exceed 7% of the principal, not in excess of $300 and 5% of
that part of the principal not in excess of $600, and 4% on any part of the principal amount
exceeding $600. Id.
20. Penick, supra note 3, at 443.
21. Id. at 441.
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10% usury limit, making small loans to Arkansas borrowers very
profitable. However, this profitable climate was not to last.
Approximately one year after the passage of the Arkansas Installment Loan Law, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided the first of
a line of cases that gradually spelled the demise of the Act and of the
numerous loopholes that had sprung up over the years. In Winston v.
PersonalFinance Co.22 the supreme court served notice on those using
such loopholes that:
[A] caveat is hereby given that in litigation concerning loans made
subsequent to the effective date of this opinion, this court will feel
free to consider anew this question of travel expenses and inspection fees which the lender may charge the borrower and in which
the charged items go to pay the expenses of the agents or employees of the lender. The question will be reconsidered in the light of
the Constitutional inhibition against usury.2 3
The court in Winston did not declare the entire Installment Loan Law
unconstitutional, but did void those sections dealing with charges. In
this regard, the court stated:
We unhesitantingly declare that any provisions in the said Act 203
which attempt, in any guise whatsoever, to permit an evasion of
the Constitution, are null and void ....
[T]he Constitution fixes
interest at a maximum rate of 10%, and any charge for the use of
money above that amount is usurious.24
On the same day that the decision in Winston was handed down,
the court decided yet another case dealing with the Installment Loan
Law. In Strickler v. State Auto Finance Co. 25 the court declared unconstitutional other sections of the Act. Again these charges were
being used to circumvent the 10% usury limit.
Other cases handed down in 1952 continued to chip away at the
Installment Loan Law and the validity of the time/price differential
as a means of evading the usury law. For example, in Hare v. General
Contract Purchase Corp.,26 the court served notice on sellers that,
while it would uphold the validity of the time/price differential one
last time, from that point on having a cash price and a time price
might no longer provide protection from the usury law.2 7 In the
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
56, 247

220 Ark. 580, 249 S.W.2d 315
Id. at 584, 249 S.W.2d at 318.
Id. at 588, 249 S.W.2d at 319.
220 Ark. 565, 249 S.W.2d 307
220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d 973
Id. at 607, 249 S.W.2d at 977.
S.W.2d 1 (1952).

(1952).

(1952).
(1952).
See also Schuck v. Murdock Accept. Corp., 220 Ark.
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words of the court:
[W]e now give the public a caveat that the effect of transactions,
such as in the case at bar, may impinge on the constitutional mandate against usury, and transactions entered into after this appeal
becomes final, may be subjected to the taint of usury with the
aforementioned decisions affording no protection.2 8
The Hare decision effectively closed the time/price differential loophole for evading the usury law. The final blow to the time/price doctrine came in 1957 when the court, in Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co. ,29 stated that the Hare caveat applied not only to transactions
involving finance companies but also to sales of merchandise on
credit.
By the end of the year the liberalization trend had been completely reversed. The sections of the Installment Loan Law that were
not declared null and void in 1952 were effectively repealed during the
1953 legislative session. 3° Thus, in little more than a year, the liberal
trend established over a seventy-five year period came to an abrupt
halt. All the decisions that had been part of this trend were effectively
reversed, and from this point on the court interpreted the 1874 constitutional provision strictly.
The finance companies, which had invested over one million dollars in start-up costs, were not prepared to stand for this reversal
without a fight.3 1 A series of cases tested both the limits of the caveat
as stated in Hare and the validity of transactions entered into prior to
the date of that decision. The decisions in these cases upheld the law
as stated by the court in its caveat.3 2 Transactions entered into prior
to the ruling in Hare were decided on the basis of previous court decisions which had upheld the time/price doctrine but which now conflicted with the more recent rulings of the court. With the failure of
the assault on the newly defined usury law, along with the failure of
other loopholes and legislative initiatives, most finance companies saw
no other choice than to leave the state. 33 In their view, a strictly construed 10% usury rate left a less than adequate profit margin on
28. Hare, 220 Ark. at 607, 249 S.W.2d at 977.
29. 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802 (1957).
30. 1953 Ark. Acts 391 (repealing 1951 Ark. Acts 203).
31. Penick, supra note 3, at 451.
32. See Murdock Accept. Corp. v. Clift, 222 Ark. 313, 259 S.W.2d 517 (1953); Pacific
Finance Corp. v. Tinsley, 222 Ark. 723, 262 S.W.2d 282 (1953); Aunspaugh v. Murdock Accept. Corp., 222 Ark. 141, 258 S.W.2d 559 (1953); Crisco v. Murdock Accept. Corp., 222 Ark.
127, 258 S.W.2d 551 (1953); Murdock Accept. Corp. v. Higgins, 222 Ark. 140, 258 S.W.2d
558 (1953). See also, Penick, supra note 3, at 450.
33. See generally, Penick, supra note 3, at 451-57.

1989-90]

USURY LAW

which to base lending activity of this type in Arkansas.3 4
The legacy that the State was left with after this reinterpretation
of the 1874 constitutional provision was a usury law that was strictly
construed. The 10% limit did not vary with the nature of the loan or
its parameters. Thus, determining the interest rate limit in Arkansas
was not a difficult problem. Not only did the constitution make determining the maximum rate relatively easy, it also prevented any special
legislation or business practices designed to circumvent the 10%
limit. This meant that Arkansas was left with what amounted to an
ironclad 10% rate that permitted no exceptions. Over the years many
cases were brought that tested both the limits and severity of the
usury provision.3 5 As defendants and plaintiffs soon found, however,
courts strictly construed the usury provision, and any subterfuge or
attempt to evade the usury law was met with the prescribed, heavy
penalties (forfeiture of both principal and interest).3 6
As harsh as this interpretation was, this was the situation that
existed from the late 1950s through the 1970s. This usury limit was
not a major problem as long as the market rate of interest remained
well below the 10% limit. This was essentially the case during this
period. For example, throughout the early 1950s the prime rate
ranged between 2% and 3.5%. By the latter part of the 1950s the rate
had inched up into the 4% range, finally hitting 5% in September
1959. During the first half of the 1960s, the prime rate stayed around
the 5% level but began a steady climb thereafter. In the period from
1966 to 1970, the prime rate rose steadily from 5.5% in 1966 to 8% in
early 1970. Soon after, however, interest rates began a gradual decline so that by the beginning of 1972 the prime rate was back down
to the 4% range. This brief respite from high rates was not to last
long.
Beginning in April 1972 interest rates began to rise once again.
By the beginning of 1973 the prime rate had risen to 6%, and by
September of that year the rate was fluctuating between 9% and
10%.17 The prime rate fell slightly in the first quarter of 1974 (into
34. It is interesting to note that the prime rate during this period (1951-53) was approximately 3%. Thus, a 7% differential between the prime and the usury limit at this time was
evidently not large enough for finance companies to maintain a profitable operation in Arkansas. See, 56 Fed. Res. Bull. A33 (1970). All interest rate data quoted throughout this article
are found in the yearly volumes of the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
35. See, e.g., Redbarn Chemicals, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 254 Ark. 557, 494 S.W.2d 720 (1973);
Arkansas Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Mack Trucks of Arkansas, Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 566
S.W.2d 128 (1978); Strawn Furniture Co. v. Austin, 280 Ark. 69, 655 S.W.2d 397 (1983).

36. See ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 13.
37. It should be kept in mind that the prime rate is the rate that banks charge their best
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the 8-9% range) but continued its climb in the second and third
quarters of the year. By election time the prime rate was at 11%.
The relatively high interest rates in this period put banks and
other lending institutions under tremendous pressure. It simply was
not profitable to lend money at 10% in Arkansas when the same
money could earn the market rate in other states that were not hampered by a strict usury law. As a result, Arkansas began to experience
a capital outflow. Loanable funds began flowing to other states that
allowed higher interest rates. This, in turn, resulted in credit rationing within the state as lending institutions began to restrict loans to all
but their best customers. The stringent usury law also led to higher
retail prices as retailers raised prices to cover the extra cost of servicing their lending activities in the state.38 In one study, for example,
it was shown that major appliances cost from 4% to 7% more in
Little Rock as compared to comparable cities outside the state.3 9 The
relatively high prime rate and the resulting capital outflow brought
renewed attention to the Arkansas usury law.
Due to the pressure that lending institutions were facing in the
state, the Arkansas Credit Requirement Committee was formed in the
latter half of 1973 by business and financial interests to work for passage of Proposed Amendment 57 to the Arkansas Constitution. The
committee was composed mainly of businessmen from the Little Rock
area.A The proposed amendment read as follows: "All contracts for
an unlawful rate of interest shall be void as to principal and interest.
The maximum lawful rate of interest, except when the General Assembly shall determine otherwise, shall be 10% per annum. When no
rate is agreed upon, the rate shall be 6% per annum., 41 The proposed
amendment was designed to place the regulation of interest rates in
the hands of the state legislature. Thus, the proposed amendment
would not strike the 1874 amendment. It would just add another
clause, giving the legislature authority to change the usury rate. If the
legislature did not act the rate would remain at 10%.42 The idea was
that economic conditions could be reviewed every few years with an
and most reliable customers. For customers not falling into this category, interest rates are
generally much higher.
38. Arkansas: A Usury Law Dries Up Loan Funds, Bus. WK., Sept. 29, 1973, at 73-74.
39. Id.
40. L. Brown, The History and Effect of the Arkansas Usury Law on Arkansas Institutions
and Worthen Bank and Trust Company, N.A., Exhibit 11 (1980) (available at Worthen Bank
and Trust Co., Little Rock, AR.).
41. Arkansas Gazette, Dec. 29, 1973, at A2, col. 1.
42. If the contract did not specify an interest rate the maximum rate was to be 6%. This
was the same as the 1874 provision.
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appropriate adjustment in the usury rate by the state legislature if
necessary.
The arguments that the proponents used in urging passage of
Proposed Amendment 57 can be summarized as follows: 1) cash
prices in Arkansas were abnormally high because of merchants' efforts to cover the cost of offering credit in the state; 2) Arkansas border cities, such as Texarkana and Fort Smith, were suffering because
of differential interest rates; 3) credit sales were limited and merchants
were demanding faster payment; 4) risky investment projects were unable to get financing; and 5) credit standards were extremely high,
meaning that people with poor credit histories were unable to get
3
4

loans.

Those urging defeat of Proposed Amendment 57 were many.
The state AFL-CIO," the Arkansas Education Association, 4 5 the Arkansas Farmers Union, 4 6 and then Governor Bumpers4 7 all came out
in opposition to Proposed Amendment 57. Although these groups
were basically opposed to the proposed amendment, one can nevertheless discern two distinct, but nonetheless related, positions on the
issue. On the one hand, there were those who believed that there
should not be any change in the usury law whatsoever. They believed
that Arkansas was not being hurt by the 10% limit and that removal
of this limit would result in higher prices and in a "money grab" by
finance companies taking advantage of the higher rate. They also
viewed the state legislature as being controlled by the bankers and
thought that turning over the decision regarding the interest rate limit
to the legislature would be tantamount to economic suicide.48
The other major position was held by those who felt that some
change in the usury law was necessary but that this was not the way
to do it. They distrusted the state legislature and felt that passage of
Proposed Amendment 57 would in effect leave Arkansans without
any interest rate ceiling and that a ceiling was definitely necessary.4 9
Thus, they were afraid that the interest rate ceiling would be set at too
high a level if the legislature was given the authority Proposed in
Amendment 57. Instead, they wanted a law that would not only remove the 10% restriction but would also leave the interest rate ceiling
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Arkansas Gazette, Mar. 7, 1974, at A6, col. 3.
Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 17, 1974, at A4, col. 1.
Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 11, 1974, at A7, col. 3.
Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 31, 1974, at Al, col. 2.
Arkansas Gazette, Aug. 30, 1974, at Al, col. 6.
For one example of this view, see Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 17, 1974, at A4, col. 1.
See, e.g., Arkansas Gazette, Jan. 19, 1974, at A7, col. 1.
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free of any legislative interference. One proposal advanced during the
debate over Proposed Amendment 57 was that the ceiling be set at
twice the Federal Reserve discount rate.5 ° The discount rate at this
time was 7.5%. This would have made the interest rate ceiling 15%
under this formula. The prime rate in January 1974, for example, was
slightly below 10%, making the 15% rate an attractive alternative to
the constitutionally imposed usury limit.
The petition drive to place the proposed amendment on the ballot was successful with the proponents collecting over 200,000 signatures (only about 65,000 were needed).5" However, the proposed
amendment was overwhelmingly defeated in the general election held
on November 5, 1974. Despite the best efforts of the proponents, only
13% of the voters cast their ballots in favor of Proposed Amendment
57. The effort to change the constitutionally imposed 10% limit was
dead at least for the time being.
One of the factors that undoubtedly led to the defeat of Proposed
Amendment 57 was fear of what the legislature might do with its
newly acquired authority over the interest rate ceiling. However, another influence was at work during the latter part of 1974 that played
a role in the defeat of the proposed amendment. This influence resulted from passage of a new federal law-the so-called Brock Actwhich essentially circumvented state usury laws for commercial and
agricultural loans over $25,000.52
The Brock Act was introduced into the Senate by Senator William E. Brock III (Rep., Tenn.). It was cosponsored in the Senate by
Senators William Fulbright (Dem., Ark.) and Mike Mansfield (Dem.,
Mont.).5 3 The expressed intent of the Act was to provide temporary
federal legislative relief from the strict usury laws that existed in Arkansas, Tennessee, 54 and Montana.5 5 The Act's three-year life was
designed to give the states some breathing room and an opportunity
to change their usury laws.
The Brock Act amended both the National Bank Act 56 and the
50. Id.
51. Arkansas Gazette, June 28, 1974, at A19, col. 4.
52. Brock Act, Title II, Pub. L. No. 93-501, 88 Stat. 1557, 1558-60 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Brock Act was set to expire on the earlier of
July 1, 1977, or such date that a state legislature might override the provisions of the Act. See
206 of the Act.
53. Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 14, 1974, at A], col. 5.
54. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (1870).
55. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 47-125 (1947).
56. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. V, 1975).
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Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 57 As was noted above, the Brock Act
provided for federal preemption of state usury laws for national and
federally insured state banks and savings and loans. The law allowed
such institutions to charge 5% above the Federal Reserve discount
rate on business and agricultural loans over $25,000. The law went
into effect on October 29, 1974, and was set to expire on July 1, 1977.
The passage of the Brock Act was undoubtedly another factor
that led to the defeat of Proposed Amendment 57. The business and
financial community in general realized that some of the pressure for
the proposed amendment had been reduced as a result of this Act, but
only for loans over $25,000. The discount rate in November 1974 was
8%, so the maximum rate that national banks, insured state banks,
and savings and loans could charge for loans over $25,000 was 13%.
With the prime rate in this period at about 11%, the Act provided
lending institutions a two percentage point spread and some much
needed relief. Vendor and all other financing remained bound by the
Arkansas 10% usury limit.
Although the Brock Act provided some relief, its one major
problem was that it indexed the interest rate to the Federal Reserve
discount rate rather than to a market-oriented rate. Normally, the
discount rate does not provide any clear indication of monetary conditions. In fact, Arthur Bums, chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board at the time, stated that something like the ninety-day U.S.
treasury bill rate would have been a better index than the discount
rate. 5" The Brock Act most likely utilized the discount rate since the
National Bank Act59 already provided for a rate equalling 1% over
this rate for national banks. Thus, there was some precedent for tying
the interest ceiling under the Act to the discount rate. Despite this
shortcoming of the Brock Act, it provided states with needed relief
from restrictive usury laws. 6°
Right after the defeat of Amendment 57 interest rates began to
decline, so that by the middle of January 1975 the prime rate stood at
10%, a full percentage point lower than at election time. Rates con57. Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (Supp. V, 1975).
58. Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 8, 1974, at A6, col. 1.
59. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (Supp. V, 1975).
60. In Stephens Sec. Bank v. Eppivic Corp., 411 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd, 553
F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977), the defendant corporation challenged the validity of the Brock Act
on constitutional grounds. The Brock Act and Arkansas' strict usury limit were obviously in
direct conflict. After a careful examination of the history of federal control over state (through
the Federal Reserve and FDIC systems) and national banking systems, the court concluded
that the Brock Act was constitutional and, thus, able to preempt the 10% Arkansas usury
limit.
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tinued to fall throughout the year. By the middle of January 1976,
the prime rate was 6.75%, a rate that had not been seen for about
three years. The prime rate stayed at about this level during 1976,
closing the year at 6.25%. During this period of relatively low interest rates, the Arkansas usury law, as in the past, was not a major
problem for business and financial interests in the state. The spread
between the prime rate and the 10% usury rate was large enough to
mute much of the public grumbling about the restrictive nature of the
state's usury law. 6 However, that all changed once again in the middle of 1977 when interest rates began another climb to what would be
a record level for this century.
On August 22, 1977, the prime rate moved upward to 7% from
6.75%. This signalled a trend that was not to be reversed for the next
three years. At the beginning of 1978 the prime rate stood at 8%, and
it continued its climb for the rest of the year. By the beginning of
1979 the prime rate once again was 11.75%. Interest rates continued
to increase during the rest of the year, with the prime rate eventually
climbing to 15.25% by the beginning of 1980.
As expected, the large increase in interest rates during the years
1977 through 1980 created another credit crunch in the state. Once
again the business and financial communities began to call for a
change in the Arkansas usury law.6 2 Since the Brock Act had expired
on July 1, 1977, Arkansas did not even have the benefit of the federal
override of the state limit for large business loans. This meant that
Arkansans were once again bound across the board by the 10% interest rate ceiling.
The second major credit crunch of the 1970s did not fully take
hold in the state until about the middle of 1978, when the prime rate
increased to 8.75% on June 16 and then increased even further (to
9%) on June 30. These high rates were a direct result of the federal
government's efforts to control inflationary pressures within the
economy.
61. One need only look at the number of usury related articles in the Arkansas Gazette
during the periods 1975-77 and 1973-74 to get some idea of the decline in interest in the usury
law during this time. There was a total of 80 usury related articles in the Arkansas Gazette
during the high interest rate years of 1973-74. This number had dwindled to a mere 13 articles
during the years of 1975-77, after interest rates had eased. See S.J. Henderson, Arkansas Gazette Index, Arkansas Tech University Library, Russellville, Arkansas.
62. The large increase in the number of usury related articles in the Arkansas Gazette in
the period, 1978-80, reflected this dissatisfaction. There were 225 usury related articles in the
Arkansas Gazette in the period 1978-80 as opposed to 13 for the period 1975-77. See S.J.
Henderson, Arkansas Gazette Index, Arkansas Tech University Library, Russellville,
Arkansas.

1989-90]

USURY LAW

In 1978 the business and financial communities within the state
responded to these high rates in a variety of ways. First, midway
through 1978, lenders stopped making VA and FHA loans because
these rates had gone to 9.5%.63 Lenders were fearful that the 1/2% to
1% mortgage insurance premium, on top of the 9.5% rate, might put
these loans into the usurious category. At the time, there was no federal preemption of state usury laws for VA and FHA loans. Also,
mortgage bankers began to require a minimum of 20% down for conventional mortgage loans. 64
Lenders also began to tighten their requirements for making
small, consumer-type loans in response to these high interest rates.
As a result, many consumers with poor credit histories were unable to
obtain loans. Also, many bankers refused to make consumer loans of
less than $3000 because of the restrictive nature of the state usury
law. 6' They argued that loans smaller than that amount were
unprofitable.
The second major response from within the state to the usury
limit came in the form of pressure on the federal government to pass
another override bill (such as the Brock Act) to preempt the 10%
limit. The Arkansas congressional delegation supported such a bill.
Also, the financial community sent a steady stream of lobbyists to
Washington to drum up support for such legislation. 66 However, Senator William Proxmire, Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee,
was opposed to any further federal overrides of the Arkansas usury
limit. He felt that this was a state problem and that it should be dealt
with at that level. 67 The federal government, by the Brock Act, had
given Arkansans a chance to do something about the state usury limit,
and the state had done nothing in response. Why should the federal
government bail the state out a second time? Because of this opposition, no federal override of state usury laws was passed during 1978.
A third reaction by the financial community in response to the
relatively high interest rates in 1978 was its use of a provision of the
National Bank Act 68 which permitted national banks to charge 1%
over the discount rate for any type of loan. 69 At this point the discount rate was 9.5% which allowed national banks to charge 10.5%
63. Arkansas Gazette, July 2, 1978, at E5, col. 1.

64. Id.
65. Arkansas Gazette, Aug. 30, 1978, at C5, col. 2.
66. Arkansas Gazette, Aug. 2, 1978, at Al, col. 6.
67. Id.
68. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1982).

69. Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 3, 1978, at Al, col. 8.
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on all loans. While national banks in Arkansas were permitted to
charge more than the usury rate, the extra 1/2% (over the 10% rate)
did not give the banks much breathing room. The prime rate at this
time was already 10.75%. Also, since this provision only applied to
national banks, state chartered banks and savings and loans were excluded from this extra 1/2% point return.
A fourth response to the credit crunch in the state was a suit,
filed in November 1978, challenging the constitutionality of the state's
10% usury limit. 70 The suit filed by the First National Bank of Little
Rock, the American State Bank of Charleston, and a joint business
venture (Quinn-Moore), sought a declaratory judgment that the
state's 10% usury limit violated several sections of the United States
Constitution and should be declared invalid. The complaint alleged
that the 10% rate was a burden on interstate commerce.71 Plaintiffs
argued that when the price of money approaches the 10% limit borrowers cannot borrow money originating from another state. This
occurs because lenders do not find it profitable to borrow outside the
state at rates that are higher than the Arkansas usury limit. This, the
plaintiffs argued, places an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce by impeding the flow of money across state lines. Other bases
for the suit were the supremacy clause 72 and the fourteenth amendment due process, equal protection, 73 and privileges and immunities
clauses. Trial was scheduled for the fall of 1979.
As 1979 began, the prime rate was at 11.75%, almost four percentage points higher than it was at the same time the previous year.
The relatively high interest rates in the early part of 1979 led Arkansas bankers to renew their efforts to obtain another federal usury override through Congress. 74 The proposed legislation would bypass
Arkansas' usury provision for business and agricultural loans over
$25,000. The rate allowed on such loans was to be 5% above the
Federal Reserve discount rate for both national banks and federally
chartered institutions. As originally proposed, the legislation would
not affect the 10% usury limit for home mortgages, consumer loans,
70. Quinn-Moore v. Lambert, No. 78-6045 (Pulaski Co. Cir. Nov. 1978), aff'd, 272 Ark.
324, 614 S.W.2d 230, appeal dismissed (for want of a federal question), 454 U.S. 805 (1981).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8(3).
72. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
73. With respect to the equal protection claim, plaintiffs argued that the state usury provision did not apply equally to all citizens of Arkansas because some were able to borrow at
higher rates outside the state while others could not.
74. Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 23, 1979, at A8, col. 1. As interest rates continued their rise,
Sen. William Proxmire's earlier opposition to a new federal usury override began to disappear.
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or loans under $25,000." s Both the Arkansas Senate and House delegations were solidly behind the legislation."6 Also, the proposed legislation was to remain in effect only until December 31, 1980. This
would give Arkansans, who were to vote on a new constitution in
1980, another chance to change the state's usury provision."
While this legislation was making its way through Congress,
other federal legislation was introduced by the Arkansas congressional delegation that would exempt both VA and FHA housing loans
from state usury limits. 8 As noted above, many lenders in Arkansas
had stopped making VA and FHA loans as the market rate of interest
moved past the 10% usury limit. This legislation was designed to
correct that problem.
At the state level, as interest rates continued to rise, the pace of
activity surrounding the usury issue became more frantic. This was to
be expected since lenders were limited to charging the 10% rate while
having to borrow in the marketplace at rates approaching 15% by
year's end.
Several developments occurred during 1979 which illustrate the
pace of this activity. First, the Fair Arkansas Interest Rates Committee (FAIR) was formed during 1979 to work for a change in the Arkansas usury provision. 79 Second, the Quinn-Moore trial, involving
the constitutionality of Arkansas' 10% usury limit got underway.
The trial started on September 18, 1979, and was to last five weeks.
Third, state banks received a favorable ruling from the Attorney General's office allowing them to participate in national bank loans at
rates higher than the 10% usury limit.8 0 At this point (September
1979) national banks were making loans at 11.5% (1% over the discount rate of 10.5%). In a later opinion, the Attorney General's office
gave its stamp of approval for the same type of activity on the part of
savings and loans. 8 ' Fourth, state banks revealed plans to bring suit
to challenge the federal law that allowed national banks to charge
75. Arkansas Gazette, Mar. 1, 1979, at Al, col. 5.
76. Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 23, 1979, at A8, col. 1.
77. The constitutional convention held in 1979 decided that the usury issue should be a
separate item on the ballot. The reason for doing this was to insure that a negative vote on the
usury question would not have any effect on the constitution being proposed. Arkansans were
to be given two choices regarding usury. One was to leave the current 10% limit unchanged,
while the other would allow a limit of 5% over the discount rate or 10%, whichever was
greater. Arkansas Gazette, Aug. 7, 1979, at A4, col. 4.
78. Arkansas Gazette, May 2, 1979, at Al, col. 4.
79. Arkansas Gazette, Mar. 15, 1979, at C6, col. 3.
80. 79 Op. Att'y Gen. 116 (1979).
81. 79 Op. Att'y Gen. 143 (1979).
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more for loans (1% over the discount rate) than state banks.8 2
In September an event occurred that added further evidence to
the debate over the relative inefficiency of the state's usury limit. Toward the end of the third quarter in 1979, the yield on six-month
treasury bills moved above the 10% level (10.315%). Rates on
money market certificates, a relatively new instrument at the time,
were tied to the six-month treasury bill rate. In order to stay abreast
of the market rate on these short term investments and to insure an
adequate supply of funds, three Arkansas savings and loans (two with
a federal charter and one with a state charter) began to offer rates
above 10% on money market certificates.8 3 The federally chartered
savings and loans were arguing that they were entitled to circumvent
the state usury limit because they were members of the Federal Home
Loan Bank system. This, they argued, included them under federal
laws which allowed the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to set interest rates for its members.8 4 Both the state bank and state securities
commissioners8 5 disregarded this argument. Instead they issued opinions stating that "usury is usury" and that the 10% usury limit also
applied to what banks and savings and loans could pay to depositors.
In addition to muddying the waters surrounding the usury issue,
these opinions placed the financial community under increased pressure to find alternative sources of funding. A 10% cap on deposits
meant that money would continue to flow outside the state in order to
seek the highest rate possible.
Most national banks did not exceed the 10% usury limit on
money market certificates. Their position was that a subsection of
Regulation Q,8 6 which governed interest rates for national banks, prevented them from paying more to depositors than what state banks
could pay under existing state regulations.87 Four national banks did,
however, begin offering a rate higher than the 10% limit on money
market certificates.8 8 State banks responded to this by appealing to
the comptroller of the currency to begin enforcing Regulation Q
which prevented national banks from offering depositors higher rates
82. Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 25, 1979, at Al, col. 2.
83. Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 13, 1979, at Al, col. 4.

84. 12 U.S.C. § 1425a (1982).
85. The securities commissioner supervised the savings and loans in the state.

86. 12 C.F.R. § 7.7310 (1979).
87. Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 13, 1979, at Al, col. 4.
88. National banks at Fayetteville, Springdale, Fort Smith, Malvern, and Stuttgart were
paying the going national rate of 10.662% on money market certificates in October 1979.
Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 17, 1979, at All, col. 1.
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than what state banks could offer.8 9
In the midst of the confusion over what banks could legally pay
their depositors on money market certificates, the State Banking
Board decided to reverse its position and allow state banks to pay
more than the 10% rate on these short-term instruments. 9° In effect,
the Banking Board decided to ignore the state constitutional usury
provision. The payment of more than 10% was made contingent on
three conditions. First, the bank had to agree not to raise the defense
of usury on any liability to its depositors. Second, the bank had to
agree to publish a notice to this effect in a newspaper and to send a
copy to the bank commissioner. Third, if the bank decided to pay
more than 10%, it would have to insure that its usury pledge was part
of the deposit contract and that the bank's board of directors approved the action.9 This action on the part of the State Banking
Board prompted the Attorney General to file suit to determine what
rates depositors could be paid under the state's usury law. 92 However, this suit was soon withdrawn, and many other suits became
moot when President Carter, in the last two months of the year,
signed several bills that preempted state usury laws. 93
Toward the end of 1979, it became clear that Congress was becoming increasingly concerned about the problems caused by the restrictive usury laws in many states. Congressional concern about
these problems is typified by the remarks of Representative Hinson:
"Many of our states, approximately 20, are now experiencing
problems by hitting the bottom of their statutory usury ceiling....
The problem is growing more serious. Many of our state-chartered
banks are having trouble with agricultural and mortgage loans .... ."94
Congress responded to these concerns by passing, in the last few
months of the year, several pieces of legislation designed to override
restrictive state usury laws. For example, on November 5, 1979, President Carter signed what was commonly known as the Borrower's
Relief Act.9 5 This legislation, which had been introduced in Congress
earlier in the year by the Arkansas Senate and House delegations, was
specifically designed to alleviate the problems in the state caused by
89. Id.
90. Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 23, 1979, at Al, col. 3.
91. Id.
92. Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 30, 1979, at A4, col. 3.
93. Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 3, 1979, at Al, col. 8.
94. 125 CONG. REC. H12127 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1979).
95. Borrower's Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 96-104, 93 Stat. 789 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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the 10% usury limit. Its purpose was to provide interim relief to
Arkansans while the more general, federal legislation (The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
(DIDMCA)9 6 which would become effective in 1980) was wending its
way through the legislative process. The Borrower's Relief Act was
to expire if Arkansans voted to keep the 10% usury limit, or on July
1, 1981, which ever came first.
The Borrower's Relief Act was not a consumer-oriented bill in
that it did not provide any direct relief for consumers. However, it
did give financial institutions some relief from the state usury provision, which ultimately had an impact on consumers. The Act permitted all federally insured institutions to charge 5% above the Federal
Reserve discount rate on business and agricultural loans greater than
$25,000. 9' The discount rate at this point was 12%, so the Act allowed Arkansas financial institutions to begin making loans at 17%.
The prime rate was 15.25% which gave lending institutions about a
two percentage point spread between the prime and loan rate. The
Act also preempted state-imposed ceilings on rates paid for sizeable
deposits. This meant that both banks and savings and loans were now
able to pay the going rate (approximately 12%) for certificates of deposit and money market certificates.
It is important to realize what the Act did not do. It did not
apply to consumer loans nor loans of less than $25,000. Thus, it did
not help car, furniture, or appliance dealers sell their products. Also,
the Act provided no relief for the housing industry, so real estate
loans were still bound by the state's 10% usury limit. However, legislation signed by the President later in the year did provide some
needed help in this area.
On November 28, 1979, President Carter signed a bill which exempted all VA housing loans from state usury limits if FHA housing
loans were also made exempt. 98 The FHA counterpart to this bill was
signed into law on December 21, 1979, so both types of loans were
exempt from the state's rigid 10% limit. 99 While this legislation provided some assistance, conventional (nonbusiness) real estate loans
were still bound by the 10% usury limit.
Congress responded to the continuing pressure felt by the
96. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132, 161 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
97. Thus, all federally insured state banks and savings and loans were also exempt from
the state usury provision.
98. 38 U.S.C. § 1828 (1982).
99.

12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1982).
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housing industry in Arkansas by passing yet another stopgap measure
which was signed into law on December 28, 1979, and was to last for
three months. This was the Consumer Services and Usury Act which
superceded state usury provisions for loans secured by a first lien on
residential property and business or agricultural loans in excess of
$25,000.'" There was no maximum interest rate for loans secured by
such a mortgage, and therefore, loans made in accordance with this
section could not be challenged under any state usury limitations.
The upper limit on the interest rate for agricultural or business loans
was not to exceed "5 per centum in excess of the discount rate on
ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve district
where the bank is located."' ' 1 Any transactions not covered by the
Act came in under the individual state usury limitations.
At the start of 1980 the prime rate was 15.25%. During the first
part of the year it continued to climb, ultimately, reaching a record
high of 20% by April 2. Thereafter, the prime rate fell steadily, falling to a low of 11 % by the end of July. However, by the end of
August the prime rate began another steady increase and eventually
surpassed the record (20%) set just a few months earlier. By the end
of December, the prime had set a new, modem day record of 21.5%.
Despite the presence of the preemptive federal legislation, the
business and banking communities in Arkansas realized that these
were only stopgap measures that would eventually expire. 10 2 The
constitutional convention that had met in 1979 provided voters a
choice between two alternative amendments in the November 1980
general election. One amendment left the 10% usury rate intact; the
other allowed a maximum rate of 5% over the discount rate. The
constitutional convention was to meet again in the summer of 1980 to
finalize the usury proposals and the proposed constitution and to
make any necessary changes in anticipation of the November general
election.
In January of that year, in what was called an extended session, 10 3 the legislature began to consider its own constitutional
amendment on usury. This meant that the voter might be faced with
three usury proposals on the November ballot--one emanating from
the General Assembly and two from the constitutional convention.
The General Assembly proposed that the legislature set the interest
100. Consumer Services and Usury Act, Pub. L. No. 96-161, 93 Stat. 1233 (1979) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
101. 93 Stat. at 1235, §§ 201, 202.
102. The VA and FHA housing usury overrides were, however, permanent.
103. The General Assembly had recessed in April 1979 and reconvened in January 1980.
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rate, despite the fact that this same proposal was soundly defeated in
the 1974 election.
The proposal finally passed by the General Assembly left the interest rate at 10% unless changed by the state legislature.1°4 There
were to be different classes of loans with differing interest rates, and a
two-thirds vote in both houses was required to either raise or lower
the rate. The then current penalty for usury-loss of interest and
principal-would be the same unless changed by the legislature. Governor Clinton expressed some skepticism about this proposed amendment in light of the 1974 defeat of a similar proposal. 10 5 Governor
Clinton acknowledged, though, that some change in the 10% usury
limit was definitely in order. 10 6 The Fair Arkansas Interest Rates
Committee (FAIR) favored the proposed constitutional amendment
as passed by the legislature. 0 7 On the other hand, the state AFL-CIO
0 8
opposed any change in the state usury law.1
One plan that was defeated during this extended session of the
General Assembly tied the maximum interest rate to the discount
rate. 10 9 Members of the banking and business communities felt that
more flexibility would be attained by giving the legislature authority
over the maximum rate rather than having it tied to an economic indicator. The business community also argued that a maximum rate tied
to some national rate would represent an enormous administrative
burden because it might be difficult to tell what the usury limit was at
any particular time. "0 Despite the fact that a proposal similar to the
one passed by the legislature had been defeated in 1974, many members of the state legislature felt that the period of high interest rates
had eased most people's fears about having the General Assembly determine the maximum interest rate. This assumption soon proved to
be incorrect.
On March 7, 1980, the Arkansas Circuit Court of Appeals issued
the Quinn-Moore decision."' After a five-week trial, with over 130
witnesses, Judge Bullion ruled that the state usury limit did not
104. H.R.J. Res. 9, 72nd Gen. Assembly, Extended Sess. 1980, 1981 Ark. Acts 2380.
105. Arkansas Gazette, Jan. 9, 1980, at A4, col. 1.
106. Id.
107. The Arkansas Farm Bureau argued that letting the state legislatures set the maximum
rate would be too hard to sell to farmers. The Bureau called for a maximum of 3% above the
discount rate. Arkansas Gazette, Jan. 15, 1980, at A10, col. 1.
108. Arkansas Gazette, Jan. 9, 1980, at A4, col. 1.
109. Arkansas Gazette, Jan. 15, 1980, at Al, col. 2.
110. Arkansas Gazette, Jan. 6, 1980, at A14, col. 1.
111. Quinn-Moore v. Lambert, No. 78-6045 (Pulaski Co. Cir. Nov. 1978), aff'd, 272 Ark.
324, 614 S.W.2d 230, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 805 (1981).
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conflict with the due process clause, equal protection clause, or commerce clause of the United States Constitution. This decision would
eventually be upheld on appeal by the Arkansas Supreme Court in
1981. Thus, one additional avenue for changing the state constitutional usury provision had been closed to the business and banking
communities in the state.
On April 1, 1980, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980112 formally went into ef13
fect. Title V of this Act specifically concerned state usury laws.'
Title V, which essentially paralleled and extended for three years the
federal override legislation passed in 1979,"' effectively dispensed
with state interest rate limitations on loans secured by first mortgages
on residential real property and agricultural and business loans in exThe DIDMCA limited business and agricultural
cess of $25,000."
loans of over $25,000 to a rate that was not to exceed 5% more than
the Federal Reserve discount rate. The DIDMCA placed no interest
rate limit on residential real estate loans secured by a first mortgage.
On October 8, 1980, the $25,000 limit on business and agricultural
loans was lowered to $1000.116
The section of the DIDMCA dealing with residential housing
loans was permanent. However, states had a right to reject this section, and consequently reimpose whatever state usury limit had existed before DIDMCA, by acting before April 1, 1983. The portion of
the DIDMCA relating to business and agricultural loans over $25,000
(later $1000) was to expire on April 1, 1983, but could be overridden
by states if they so chose.
At this time, the prime rate was 20% while the discount rate
stood at 13%. Thus, financial institutions in Arkansas were allowed
112. See supra note 96.
113. Arkansas was by no means the only state to have interest rate restrictions. Many
states had usury laws on their books. For example, at the start of 1980, 39 states had either
fixed maximum rates or ceilings that floated with some market index for mortgage loans. In
many of these states, the maximum rate for mortgage loans was below the general market rate.
The DIDMCA was designed to provide some relief from these restrictive state usury laws.
Congress, seeing the harm that might result in the economy from these restrictive usury laws,
decided to take the initiative since states were not relaxing their ceilings quickly enough. But
Congress deferred to the states' historical role in setting usury ceilings by giving them an
opportunity to override any or all of the provisions of Title V.
114. Consumers Services and Usuary Act, supra note 100.
115. It should be pointed out that the DIDMCA did not abolish state usury laws. It
merely provided that state usury laws would not apply to these transactions. Also, if a state so
chose, it could override the provisions regarding residential housing, business, and agricultural
loans.
116. 12 U.S.C. § 86a (1982).
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to make business and agricultural loans above the federally mandated
minimum dollar values at 18% and consumer loans at 11 %.
One provision of DIDMCA that had not been contained in any
previous federal legislation was an amendment which Senators Bumpers and Pryor managed to get added to the Bill. This section of the
DIDMCA allowed federally insured state banks, savings and loans,
and credit unions to charge 1% over the discount rate on any loan." 7
Previously, only federally chartered financial institutions had this authority. This provision was added to the DIDMCA to prevent federally chartered institutions from being able to charge higher rates than
insured state banks and savings and loans. Thus, it was designed to
prevent national banks from gaining what was seen as an unfair competitive advantage over these state institutions. These sections of the
DIDMCA were permanent, and there was no time limit set for states
to override this provision.
Realizing that a lawsuit had been filed over the legality of the
extended legislative session and, thus, that the proposed legislative
constitutional usury amendment might not make it on the November
ballot, FAIR began a two-pronged assault on the 10% usury limit.
First, FAIR began a petition drive to place a proposed constitutional
amendment on the ballot that would give the legislature authority to
set the maximum interest rate. This was to guard against the possibility that the legislative proposal might eventually be declared invalid. 1 Second, FAIR began a coordinated effort to convince delegates
to the constitutional convention to replace the two proposed constitutional amendments approved in 1979 with one amendment that would
allow the legislature to set the maximum rate.
FAIR's fear was realized in June when the Arkansas Supreme
Court ruled in Wells v. Riviere 19 that the 72nd General Assembly
violated the state constitution by merely recessing in April 1979 and
reconvening its regular session in January 1980. The court pointed
out that the state constitution provided for a sixty day legislative session. After this time the legislators were free to go home if the state's
business was finished; if that was not the case, the session could be
extended by a two-thirds vote. By recessing and reconvening whenever it wanted to, the General Assembly violated the provisions set
out in the state constitution. This being the case, the court held that
the usury amendment was not properly adopted because the legisla117. Title V, Part C, supra note 96, at 164.
118. Arkansas Gazette, May 25, 1980, at A4, col. 3.
119. 269 Ark. 156, 599 S.W.2d 375 (1980).
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ture could not enact legislation after the end of the regular session in
1979. This meant that the proposed constitutional amendment, as
passed by the legislature in the extended session, could not appear on
the November ballot. This may not have caused too much concern
within the ranks of the FAIR committee because its own proposed
amendment was identical to the now invalid legislative proposal.
The FAIR committee eventually collected approximately
125,000 signatures (only 53,429 were actually needed) in favor of
placing its proposed constitutional amendment on the ballot.' 20 The
FAIR committee also persuaded the constitutional convention to include the committee's amendment in the proposed constitution instead of the two amendments that the convention had considered
earlier. 12 ' Thus, on November 4th, voters were able to consider the
identical usury question twice--once as part of the proposed constitution and again as a separate ballot item.
For the second time in six years voters rejected a usury proposal
that would have allowed the legislature to set the maximum interest
rate. Proposed Amendment 60 was defeated with 161,424 people voting for the amendment and 201,197 voting against it (55%).122 However, the margin of defeat was less than in the 1974 election. The
proposed constitution also failed to win approval when it received
only 35% of the vote (93,530 voting for and 170,532 voting
against). 123 These voting results suggest that it was not the proposed
usury amendment that led to the defeat of the new constitution.
The proposed usury amendment was defeated for several reasons. First, voters clearly were still telling the business and financial
community that they did not want the legislature to set the maximum
rate. This distrust of the state legislature had led to the defeat of a
similar proposal in 1974. It is thus clear that the financial community
made a tactical error again in 1980 when it decided to push for legislative determination of the maximum rate rather than having it tied to
an economic indicator, such as the discount rate. The margin of defeat was small enough to suggest that Proposed Amendment 60 might
have passed had the maximum rate been tied to an economic index.
It is also clear that the public's distrust of the state legislature had
been tempered somewhat by the recent period of high interest rates.
120. Arkansas Gazette, June 24, 1980, at Al, col. 5.
121. The earlier proposals were to leave the 10% usury rate unchanged and to tie the
maximum rate to the discount rate.
122. Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 5, 1980, at A2, col. 2.
123. Id.
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A second possible reason why the proposed usury amendment
failed was that, after peaking at 20% at the beginning of April, the
prime rate had fallen to 14.5% by election time. While still high by
historic standards, the rate at election time was considerably less than
it had been just a few months earlier. This rapid fall in the prime rate
probably led to a diminished sense of urgency about changing the
constitutional usury provision in Arkansas. Thus, after spending a
reported 1.5 million dollars on the campaign to change the constitutional usury limit, the financial community, at the end of 1980, was
left with the same 10% usury limit that had existed for the previous
1 24
106 years.
A decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court late in 1980 threw
the financial community into a state of shock, but one from which it
recovered quickly. In Mclnnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc. 125 the
court had initially held that the DIDMCA did not preempt Arkansas'
10% usury limit. The court reasoned that interest rates are not interstate commerce which can be regulated by Congress. The court also
stated that "[tihe option of a state to exempt transactions within that
state from the pertinent provisions of the Depository Institutions Deregulation & Monetary Control Act of 1980, is a total contradiction
of any suggestion that the act is an exercise of the power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce."' 12 6 This decision created confusion
in the financial community since many loans had been made in reliance on the federal override provisions of DIDMCA. It created the
potential of having thousands of loans suddenly being declared usurious. As a result of this confusion, some banks stopped making loans
while others continued to rely on the federal override provisions, believing that the court's decision was obviously in error.127
Perhaps feeling the pressure of the business and financial community and seeing the potential harm that might result, the court
quickly amended its opinion seven days later.12 8 In its amended opinion, the court pointed out that its decision did not apply to national or
state banks nor to federally chartered or insured savings institutions.' 29 Thus, the court had narrowed its holding so that it would
apply only to mortgage loans made by real estate development firms
which were not financial institutions as defined by the DIDMCA.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 23, 1980, at ES, col. 2.
No. 80-254, slip op. (Ark. Dec. 22, 1980).
Id. at 4.
Arkansas Gazette, Dec. 23, 1980, at Al, col. 8.
McInnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 271 Ark. 503, 611 S.w.2d 767 (1981).
Id. at 506.
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The financial community was relieved by this amended opinion but
was concerned that the court had not completely reversed its initial
decision. 3 ° Bankers wanted the court to declare unequivocally that
the DIDMCA preempted Arkansas' 10% usury limit. There was a
feeling that the court might change its mind once again and revert
to
13
its original decision, which applied to all financial institutions. 1
To resolve the continuing question of whether Congress had the
authority to pass legislation overriding state usury limits, Cooper
Communities, on January 9, 1981, requested a rehearing of the case
by the Arkansas Supreme Court. 132 On February 23, 1981, the court
reversed itself once again and ruled that Congress acted within its
authority to pass legislation that preempted state usury laws. 3 3 In
agreeing that the DIDMCA preempted state usury laws, the court
conceded that the flow of money between states involved interstate
commerce and, thus, that Congress had the power to regulate that
flow by preempting Arkansas' 10% usury limit. The court also relied
on Stephens Security Bank v. Eppivic Corp. 134 wherein the court found

that the 1974 Brock Act could legitimately preempt state consitutional usury provisions. Consequently, this decision finally laid to rest
questions surrounding the legitimacy of the DIDMCA usury
provisions. 135
The business and banking community breathed a collective sigh
of relief after the court's reversal of this case since a potential disaster
had been avoided. However, the decision did nothing to help the
long-term situation in the state. The basic problem facing the state at
the end of 1980 was what to do about the 10% usury limit, especially
in light of the fact that one of the important usury override provisions
of the DIDMCA would expire in little over two years time (April 1,
1983).

136

130. Arkansas Gazette, Dec. 30, 1980, at Al, col. 8.
131. The uncertainty created by the decision in McInnis caused the Federal National Mortgage Association to cease making purchases of mortgages with interest rates of more than
9.5% from Arkansas institutions. See Arkansas Gazette, Jan. 17, 1981, at C5, col. 1.
132. Arkansas Gazette, Jan. 10, 1981, at A7, col. 1.
133. McInnis v. Cooper Communities, Inc., 271 Ark. 503, 611 S.W.2d 767 (1981).
134. 411 F. Supp. 61 (W.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).
135. The vote was 4-3 to overturn its previous decision. The justices had not really
changed their minds, however. Three new judges were on the court at the start of 1981. See
Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 24, 1981, at Al, col. 2.
136. Most of the DIDMCA's usury override provisions were permanent. For example, the
federal preemption for residential real estate loans was permanent unless rejected by a state
acting before April 1, 1983. This means states could reimpose ceilings if they so chose. The
one section that was not permanent was the one preempting state ceilings on business and
agricultural loans of $25,000 or more. This preemption was to expire on April 1, 1983. De-
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At the beginning of 1981 the prime rate stood at 20.5%, and the
rate remained at that level throughout most of the first three quarters
of the year.137 By the end of September, however, the rate began to
drop, eventually settling at 15.75% by the end of the year. At the
start of 1981 the discount rate stood at 13%, making the maximum
rate on business and agricultural loans 18%. Thus, financial institutions were allowed to charge a maximum of 18% under the
DIDMCA usury provisions. This was still 2.5 percentage points below the prime rate, which placed banks and other institutions under
continuing pressure to do something about the state's restrictive usury
provision.
While the business, agricultural, and housing sectors were given
some relief by the federal override legislation, consumers had been
overlooked by Congress in its haste to aid the ailing financial community. Banks were able to make consumer loans at 14% (1% plus discount), but car dealers and furniture stores, for example, were still
confined by the 10% usury limit. This meant that store owners were
in the position of having to borrow money at considerably higher
rates in order to finance consumer purchases at 10% interest. This
fact and knowledge that the business and agricultural loan exemption
under the DIDMCA would expire in 1983 led to continuing pressure
in 1981 to either do away with Arkansas' restrictive 10% usury limit
or to somehow get around it. The Arkansas Supreme Court was of
little help in this regard.
In 1981 the Arkansas Supreme Court decided another important
case involving the usury issue. The case, Quinn-Moore v. Lambert, 138
had been argued the previous year. The plaintiffs argued that Arkansas' 10% usury limit interfered with interstate commerce and denied
due process and equal protection under the law. The state argued
that it had the right under its police power to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens. Using this as a basis, the state posited that it was protecting the welfare of its citizens by limiting the
amount of interest that could be charged on contracts in the state.
The court, in a 6-0 decision, upheld the lower court ruling that
Arkansas' usury provision did not violate any provisions of the
United States Constitution. Thus, the court found no violation of due
process, no burden on interstate commerce, and no violation of the
pository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94
Stat. 132, 161 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
137. The rate dropped the first four months of the year, eventually settling at 17% on April
2nd, before climbing back up to 20% by May 19th.
138. 272 Ark. 324, 614 S.W.2d 230, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 805 (1981).
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equal protection clause of the Constitution. As the court stated, "Ultimately the question in this case narrows down not to an issue of
constitutional law but to one of public policy: What should be the
maximum interest rate in Arkansas?. . . If it is to be changed it must
'
be done by popular vote, not by judicial decision." 139
This case was
eventually appealed to the United States Supreme Court, but the
Court refused to hear it, finding no substantial federal issue involved.
Therefore, another avenue around Arkansas' restrictive constitutional
usury provision had been blocked.
Continuing high interest rates and the lack of any relief for businesses making consumer loans led to several efforts in 1981 to either
change the constitutional usury provision or to get around it by using
various subterfuges. With the General Assembly in session, efforts
were begun early in the year to deal with the restrictive usury limit at
the state level. These efforts took two forms. First, legislation was
introduced that would allow banks and savings and loans to charge
various fees on loans that would not be characterized as interest.
House Bill 128 proposed that loan origination fees, loan commitment
fees, credit life insurance premiums, late payment charges, and other
specified fees were to be excluded from the definition of interest. 1 "
This was an obvious attempt to circumvent the state usury provision,
as the opponents of this legislation were quick to point out. An
amended version of House Bill 128"'1 passed the House in a 57-8
vote 4 2 but died in the Senate Judiciary Committee, reportedly as a
result of opposition by the state AFL-CIO.'4 3
The second effort to deal with the usury issue at the state level
was more successful than the first. During the closing days of the
General Assembly in March of 1981, the legislature voted to offer
voters another opportunity to remove the 10% interest ceiling.'
The proposed constitutional amendment 145 would establish a 17%
139. Id. at 330, 614 S.W.2d at 233.
140. H.B. 128, 73d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1981).
141. An amended version of the bill defined "other charges" to be title opinion fees, survey
fees, termite inspection fees, appraisal fees, membership fees, credit report fees, hazard insurance premiums, taxes, and assessments. Also, loan orientation fees and loan commitment fees
could not exceed 3% of the principal amount of the loan. A final amendment before House
passage removed membership fees, late charges, and assessments from the fees listed above.
See Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 25, 1981, at Al, col. 2.
142. Id.
143. Arkansas Gazette, Mar. 15, 1981, at A9, col. 2.
144. H.J.R. 7, 73d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1981).
145. The popular name for this amendment was "The 1982 Interest Rate Control
Amendment."
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maximum on credit extended primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and a maximum of 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate for other loans. 4 6 The penalty for charging more than
17% for consumer loans was forfeiture by the creditor of both principal and interest. General loans that had a rate of interest greater than
the maximum lawful rate were to be void as to the unpaid interest.
Under the proposed amendment, any person who had been charged
more than the maximum rate on a general loan was eligible to recover
twice the amount of interest paid. Voters were given an opportunity
to vote on this proposed amendment in the November 1982 general
14 7
election.

Despite the fact that a new usury amendment had been proposed
and passed by the legislature, the more immediate problem of what to
do about the high interest rates in 1981 remained unresolved. Be146. The proposed amendment read as follows:
(a) General Loans:
(i) The maximum lawful rate of interest on any contract entered into after the
effective date hereof shall not exceed five percent (5%) per annum above the Federal
Reserve Discount Rate at the time of the contract.
(ii) All such contracts having a rate of interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate shall be void as to the unpaid interest. A person who has paid interest in
excess of the maximum lawful rate may recover within the time provided by law,
twice the amount of interest paid. It is unlawful for any person to knowingly charge
a rate of interest in excess of the maximum lawful rate in effect at the time of the
contract, and any person who does so shall be subject to such punishment as may be
provided by law.
(b) Consumer Loans and Credit Sales: All contracts for consumer loans and credit
sales having a greater rate of interest than seventeen percent (17%) per annum shall
be void as to principal and interest and the General Assembly shall prohibit the same
by law.
(c) Definitions: As used herein, the term:
(i) "Consumer Loans and Credit Sales" means credit extended to a natural
person in which the money, property, or service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
(ii) "Federal Reserve Discount Rate" means the Federal Reserve Discount
Rate on ninety day commercial paper in effect in the Federal Reserve Bank in the
Federal Reserve District in which Arkansas is located.
(d) Miscellaneous:
(i) The rate of interest for contracts in which no rate of interest is agreed upon
shall be six percent (6%) per annum.
(ii) The provisions hereof are not intended and shall not be deemed to supersede or otherwise invalidate any provisions of federal law applicable to loans or interest rates including loans by residential real property.
147. This was not the only constitutional amendment relating to usury proposed during
this session of the legislature. H.J.R. 21 would have allowed a 17% interest rate limit for loans
under $50,000, with no limit on loans over that amount. Under a usurious contract, the lender
would have to forfeit 150% of the interest paid. See H.J.R. 21, 73d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(1981).
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cause nothing more could be done at the state level, the business and
financial community looked again to the federal government for interim relief from the state's 10% limit. Various bills were introduced
in Congress that would provide relief from restrictive state usury limits for retailers making consumer loans. 4 8 For example, one bill
would prohibit all state usury ceilings on consumer as well as business
and agricultural loans. 149 Another bill, introduced by Senators Pryor
and Bumpers of Arkansas, would amend the DIDMCA to allow an
interest rate of 1% over the discount rate on any type of loan, thus
providing some aid to retailers making consumer credit loans. 50
However, Congress was in no mood to pass additional legislation to
help states that continually rejected efforts to change their restrictive
usury laws. Consequently, no additional preemptive federal legislation was forthcoming in 1981. Arkansans would have to wait until
the November 1982 general election for some further assistance in
dealing with the 10% usury limit.
Toward the end of 1981, the banking and business community
geared up for another campaign to change the constitutional usury
provision. The Arkansas Credit Council, an umbrella organization
for such groups as the Farm Bureau, Arkansas State Chamber of
Commerce, and the Automobile Dealers Association, was formed to
carry out the campaign.1 5 ' The committee faced the task of succeeding at something that the Fair Arkansas Interest Rate Committee
had failed to do in 1980-convincing voters to change the 10% interest limit. Those opposed to the proposed constitutional amendment
included the state AFL-CIO, which wanted a maximum of 1% or 2%
52
over the discount rate as the new interest limit.1
The prime rate was 15.75% at the beginning of 1982. After
reaching 17% toward the end of February, the rate began a downward trend that saw the prime rate fall to 11.5% by December. The
Federal Reserve discount rate-the index to which the nonconsumer
148. There were no fewer than five bills introduced into the 97th Congress (lst session)
that would provide further relief for states with restrictive usury limits. These were: .H.R.
2501 (would prohibit state usury limits for consumer, business, and agricultural loans); H.R.
3172 (would provide for 1% over discount for any type of loan); S. 963 (companion bill to
H.R. 3172); S. 1406 (would eliminate the then current federal rate ceiling for business and
agricultural loans and would preempt all state usury laws for consumer credit loans); S. 1720
(would eliminate the then current federal rate ceiling for business and agricultural loans and
would preempt all state usury laws for consumer credit loans).
149. H.R. 2501, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
150. S. 963, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
151. Arkansas Gazette, Dec. 18, 1981, at A4, col. 1.
152. Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 8, 1981, at Ell, col. 1.
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loan rate in the proposed amendment was tied-started the year at
12% and fell to 8.5% by the end of 1982. This steady decline in
interest rates throughout 1982 imposed one more hurdle for supporters of the new amendment who were concerned that the decline in
interest rates might erode some of the support for a new usury
provision.
The debate over Amendment 60 (as the new constitutional usury
provision, to be voted on in the November 1982 general election, was
called) did not begin in earnest until the middle of 1982, but by then,
the battle lines were well drawn. Endorsing Amendment 60 were
over seventy organizations,153 practically every newspaper and TV
station in the state, every major state office-holder, and every candidate for major office. 154 The reasons given by proponents for supporting Amendment 60 were the same ones that had been used previously.
In seeking a higher return, money was flowing from Arkansas to
states where a higher market rate of interest prevailed. Retail credit
was drying up, forcing many small businesses out of existence. As a
result, credit rationing was occurring, which meant that those in the
high risk category were, in many cases, unable to obtain loans. 5 '
Also, because retailers were forced to borrow at relatively high rates
while financing consumer purchases at only 10%, proponents of the
were making up the difference by
amendment argued that5 businesses
6
charging higher prices. 1
Supporters of Amendment 60 pointed out that Arkansas' 10%
limit was the most restrictive usury provision in the nation. By 1982
all states either had no limit on rates or limits that were considerably
higher than that in Arkansas."5 7 On automobile loans, for example,
Alaska had the lowest limit of all the other states, approximately
15%. "5 The very restrictive nature of Arkansas' constitutional usury
provision, supporters argued, negatively affected the state's economy
153. Some of the organizations endorsing Amendment 60 were: the American Association
of Retired Persons; the Arkansas Automobile Dealers Association; the Arkansas Bankers Association; the Arkansas Farm Bureau; the Arkansas Furniture Dealers Association; the Arkansas Homebuilders Association; the Arkansas Mortgage Bankers Association; the Arkansas
Realtors Association; the Arkansas Savings and Loan League; the Arkansas State Chamber of
Commerce. Governor Frank White endorsed the amendment as did Senators Pryor and
Bumpers and former Governor Bill Clinton. See Arkansas Gazette, July Il, 1982, at Fl, col.
2.
154. Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 3, 1982, at Al, col. 4.
155. Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 22, 1982, at A10, col. 6.
156. Arkansas Gazette, Aug. 29, 1982, at CI, col. 2.
157. Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 17, 1982, at Al, col. 4.
158. Id.
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resulting in fewer available jobs.15 9 Proponents of the amendment
also pointed out that the federal override for business and agricultural
loans (DIDMCA) would expire April 1, 1983, and that Congress was
unwilling to provide any additional assistance in the form of new federal override legislation to states with restrictive usury laws.'6 Congress viewed state usury laws as a local problem that had to be dealt
with at the local level. Opponents of the amendment pointed out,
however, that, at the request of the Arkansas Credit Council, the Arkansas congressional delegation worked to kill federal legislation that
would have extended for another year that portion of the DIDMCA
161
that preempted the 10% limit on business and agricultural loans.
Supporters countered that further overrides were not an adequate solution to the usury situation in Arkansas because they did not cover
retail consumer credit and that the legislation would not have passed
anyway. 162
J. Bill Becker, President of the Arkansas State AFL-CIO, was
the major spokesperson for those leading the fight against the proposed usury amendment to the constitution. Other groups opposing
Amendment 60 were the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP) and the Arkansas Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). 1 63 The opposition's arguments
against Amendment 60 can be summarized as follows: 64 a) people in
Arkansas would not be able to afford the large increase in interest
rates that would occur as a result of the passage of Amendment 605% over the discount rate was too large and 17% was too much for
consumer loans; b) the federal government would control local interest rates since Amendment 60 would tie the maximum rate to the
Federal Reserve discount rate; c) Amendment 60 weakened the penalty for usurious farm and business loans because instead of forfeiting
all principal and interest, the lender was only responsible for twice the
amount of interest paid (the penalty for usurious consumer loans was
to remain the same); d) Amendment 60 would prevent Arkansas from
159. Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 5, 1982, at A9, col. 1.
160. Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 21, 1982, at A7, col. 1.
161. A usury amendment was initially included in S. 2879 (which would eventually become
known as the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982), 97th Cong., 2d Sess.,
128 Cong. Rec. 25,179 (1982). Although accepted by the Senate, the usury amendment was
rejected by the House and was formally deleted in a Senate-House conference committee.
H.R. Rep. No. 97-899, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
162. Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 3, 1982, at Al, col. 4.
163. The Ku Klux Klan also stated its opposition to Amendment 60. Arkansas Gazette,
Nov. 15, 1982, at A13, col. 4.
164. Arkansas Gazette, Oct. 31, 1982, at Al, col. 5.
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1 65
ever establishing its own ceiling on first mortgage home loans.
Another attack on Amendment 60 came in the form of a lawsuit
filed by the opposition (specifically J. Bill Becker and the AFL-CIO,
as well as others) seeking to disqualify the amendment from the ballot
because of a misleading title.1 66 The ballot title for Amendment 60
was: "An Amendment to Section 13 of Article XIX of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas to Control Interest Rates and Set the
Penalty for Violations Thereof."'' 67 Bill Becker and the AFL-CIO argued that this title was misleading because Amendment 60 would decontrol interest rates by allowing the maximum rate to fluctuate, not
control the rates and that this made the ballot title deceptive.
.In a 4-3 decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the sufficiency of the proposed ballot title. The court did not dispute the fact
that the ballot title might be misleading. However, the court noted
that under the Arkansas Constitution, 6 the purpose of a ballot title
on an amendment referred by the legislature, as opposed to one referred by the people, is merely to identify the proposal and to distinguish it from other measures on the ballot. It did not have to inform
the voters of its content. According to the court, a ballot title which
meets this test will be upheld unless it constitutes a manifest fraud on
the public. In the case of Amendment 60, the court concluded that
the ballot title, while misleading, was sufficient to identify the
proposed amendment and distinguish it from other measures on the
proposed constituballot. The court, therefore, refused to remove 6the
9
1
ballot.
November
the
from
amendment
tional
In the November general election, Arkansans approved Amendment 60, with 59% of the voters voting in favor of it.' 70 This was the

165. The DIDMCA provided that states, should they so desire, could reassert a usury limit
for mortgages and other financing arrangements which were secured by first liens on residential real property (12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (Supp. 1989)). As passed by Congress, the Act provided for no such limit. Thus, the legislature and voters in Arkansas had the opportunity to
reimpose a usury limit for such loans when they considered Amendment 60 in 1982. But
instead of reasserting such a limit, Amendment 60 (§ d(ii)) contained a provision that specifically endorsed the federal preemption. Thus, the legislature wanted to make it clear that
Amendment 60 was not intended to override any portion of the DIDMCA and, thus, that
there would be no interest limit on such loans. See Amendment 60, supra note 146.
166. Becker v. Riviere, 277 Ark. 252, 641 S.W.2d 2 (1982).
167. H.J.R. 7, 73d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (1981).
168. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22.
169. The dissenters argued that deception in a ballot title, no matter what form it takes,
should never be allowed. 277 Ark. at 255-60, 641 S.W.2d at 4-7 (Smith, J.; Hickman, J.;
Purtle, J., dissenting).
170. The certified voting results were 442,325 for and 302,461 against Amendment 60. See
Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 21, 1982, at A2, col. 3.
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first change in Arkansas' usury provision in over one hundred years
and was greeted with approval by the business and financial community in the state. However, several issues immediately arose that cast
some doubt on the state legislature's ability to draft clear and unambiguous legislation. First, there was confusion over when the new
constitutional amendment would take effect. Some thought that it
might be effective immediately. Others thought that it would become
effective only after a certain period of time. The Attorney General's
office finally decided the question when it issued an opinion saying
that the new amendment would not take effect until thirty days after
the general election."' Second, there was some confusion over
whether retail merchants offering "revolving charge" accounts might
apply the new rates to existing credit balances or whether the new
rates just applied to newly incurred balances. Based on public relations considerations and on truth-in-lending laws which require fifteen days notice before raising rates 7 2 it was widely recognized that
retailers would probably charge the higher rates on newly incurred
balances only. 7 3 It was recognized that contract rates would have to
remain the same. Third, the rate that retailers could charge under the
newly adopted usury provision was another source of confusion. The
legislative intent had been to have a floating rate (5% over the discount rate) on what the legislature called "general loans" and a 17%
cap on consumer loans. The legislature did not specify anything else
about the consumer loan rate. Also, the legislature never defined
what it meant by "general loans," although at the same time it was
thought that it referred to business and agricultural loans only. After
the passage of Amendment 60, some argued that "general loans" included consumer loans as well because that category had never been
explicitly defined by the state legislature. Thus, approximately one
week after the approval of the new usury amendment, a legal question
arose over whether consumer loans were to be included in the "general loan" category. The question was important because the answer
dictated the maximum rate on consumer loans. If, as the legislature
intended, consumer loans were not to be included in the "general
loan" category, the "market rate of interest" rate would prevail on
such loans, with a maximum of 17%. On the other hand, if consumer
loans were considered part of the "general loan" category, the maximum rate on such loans would be the lesser of 5% over the discount
171. 82 Op. Att'y Gen. 152 (1982).
172. 12 C.F.R. § 2 2 6.9(c) (1988). See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1982).
173. Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 4, 1982, at Al, col. 4.
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rate or 17%. In December 1982, for example, the discount rate was
8.5% making the maximum rate allowable on consumer loans under
this interpretation 13.5%, not 17%.
All of this led to a confusing situation for those making consumer loans because no one knew what the maximum interest rate
was on consumer loans. Some lenders opted to protect themselves by
charging 13.5% (8.5% + 5%), while others charged more, betting
that the original legislative interpretation would eventually prevail in
a lawsuit. The business community realized that the question would
eventually have to be decided by the Arkansas Supreme Court. The
business and financial communities were waiting for the opportunity
to have the courts settle the question, and they did not have to wait
long. On December 22, 1982, Richard Bishop filed suit in Pulaski
County Chancery Court against Linkway stores arguing that he was
charged 15% interest on various furniture items when the maximum
allowable rate was 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate, or
13.5%.174 Bishop had purchased some $700 worth of furniture executing in part payment a conditional sales contract providing for a
total of $92.26 in interest over an eighteen month period. After a trial
on February 18, 1983, which lasted only two hours since the issues
were clear,1 75 the Chancellor ruled on March 21, 1984, that 17% was
the maximum rate on consumer loans-not the discount rate plus
5%.176 The ruling was based on the fact that the 17% maximum on
consumer loans had been the original intent of Amendment 60 and
that was what the public had understood to be the case when they
approved the new constitutional provision.
The case was appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, and a
decision on this question was handed down on July 11, 1983. In
Bishop v. Linkway Stores 7' the court, in a 4-3 decision, reversed the
lower court ruling and decided that Amendment 60 specified a flexible
interest rate on consumer loans--one that floated with the discount
rate. ' 78 The court observed that the "general loan" category in
Amendment 60 stated that the maximum rate on "any contract" was
174. Bishop v. Linkway Stores, No. 82-5572 (Pulaski Co. Chancery Ct. Dec. 22, 1982),
rev'd, 280 Ark. 106, 655 S.W.2d 426 (1983).
175. Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 19, 1983, at BI, col. 5.
176. Arkansas Gazette, Mar. 22, 1983, at Al, col. 2.
177. 280 Ark. 106, 655 S.W.2d 426 (1983).
178. The Arkansas Supreme Court, in Southwest Arkansas Communications, Inc. v. Arrington, 296 Ark. 141, 753 S.W.2d 267 (1988), reaffirmed the decision in Bishop when it ruled
that Amendment 60 limits interest rates on consumer loans to the lesser of 17% or 5% over
the Federal Reserve discount rate.
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to be 5% above the discount rate.'7 9 Since, according to the court,
consumer loans certainly fall within the category of "any contract,"
the court decided that the maximum rate on consumer loans would
have to be the lesser of 17% or 5% over the discount rate. 80 The
dissent argued that both the legislative and voter intents were being
violated by the decision and that the spirit of Amendment 60 was of
paramount importance. A rehearing was requested in the case, but
the Arkansas Supreme Court, in a 4-3 vote, refused to reconsider its
ruling. 181
82
Retailers complained bitterly about the decision in Bishop.1
They argued that a floating interest rate on consumer loans made it
difficult to monitor open-ended accounts where interest is applied to a
balance consisting of several items purchased at different times and
potentially different interest rates. Another complaint was that they
would have a difficult time tracking the discount rate and might not
always be aware of a decline in this rate. This, they argued, might
force them to charge less than 5% over discount in order to protect
themselves. Other questions dealt with the effective legal date of a
change in the discount rate and what portions of a customer's existing

account would be subject to the changed rate.18 3 Banks and savings
and loans had fewer problems with a floating rate on consumer loans,
since most of their loans were made at fixed rates. However, the financial community did predict that consumer credit might have to be
179. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 13 (Amendment 60) provides in pertinent part:
(a) General Loans:
(i) The maximum lawful rate of interest on any contract ... shall not exceed
five percent (5%) per annum above the Federal Reserve Discount Rate at
the time of the contract.
(b)

Consumer Loans and Credit Sales: All contracts for consumer loans and credit
sales having a greater rate of interest than seventeen percent (17%) per annum
shall be void ....
180. The effect of this ruling was that penalties on usurious consumer loans differed depending on whether the maximum rate exceeded was 5% over the discount rate or 17%.
Consumer loans with rates exceeding 5% over the discount rate were now void as to unpaid
interest and debtors could recover twice the amount of interest paid. Consumer loans with
rates exceeding 17% came in under the original provision which stated that such loans were to
be void as to principal and interest.
181. Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 21, 1983, at BI, col. 5.
182. The Arkansas Supreme Court in W.E. Tucker Oil Co. v. Portland Bank, 285 Ark.
453, 688 S.W.2d 293 (1985), upheld Amendment 60 and rejected an argument that the
Amendment, because of its reliance on the discount rate, unconstitutionally delegates state
authority to the federal government.
183. For a discussion of all the interpretative questions that arose with regard to the language of Amendment 60, see Barrier, Usury in Arkansas: The 17% Solution, 37 ARK. L. REV.
572 (1983).
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rationed once again if the "market rate of interest" rate continued to
rise and the discount rate did not. Thus, the financial community
realized that one of the problems with Amendment 60 was that the
discount rate was not necessarily a good indicator of the market rate.
The discount rate is a policy tool of the Federal Reserve system and
does not necessarily reflect market conditions. As a result of real and
perceived problems with Amendment 60, and less than one year after
the passage of Amendment 60, both the business and financial community began to discuss the possibility of a revised usury
84
amendment. 1
The stability of interest rates in 1983 mitigated, at least to a certain extent, the effects of the Bishop decision. The prime rate began
the year at 11% and ended the year at the same rate. 85 The discount
rate was 8.5% throughout most of the year, which created a certain
amount of stability for retailers trying to decide what rate to charge
on consumer loans. An 8.5% discount rate combined with a relatively low prime rate put retailers, and the financial community in
general, in a much better position than they had been in for many
years. The 2.5% spread between the maximum rate (13.5%) and the
prime rate (11%) gave the business and financial community some
breathing room and helped lessen, in 1983, the degree of credit rationing that had existed in earlier years. Despite the less turbulent times,
the Bishop decision nevertheless created a great deal of uncertainty for
retailers. The uncertainty involved deciding what interest rate should
be charged on consumer loans. Many retailers decided that it would
be best to continue charging 10% interest because of the difficulty in
dealing with a floating rate. Other options available to retailers were
186
to charge less than a maximum rate or to have a true floating rate.
The problems that arose with Amendment 60 as a result of the
Bishop decision prompted the financial community in early 1984 to
begin seeking a federal override of the state's new usury amendment.
As early as January 1984 Arkansas bankers were in Washington,
D.C. visiting the state's congressional delegation urging support for a
184. One problem that arose with respect to the language of Amendment 60 concerned the
provision that the maximum rate on general loans could not exceed 5% over the discount rate
at the time of the contract. This last phrase can be interpreted to mean that the maximum rate
is set at the time of the contract. Under this interpretation, adjustable rate notes that allowed
the interest rate to increase as the discount rate increased would be considered usurious if the
rate exceeded the rate existing at the time of the contract. For a more thorough discussion of
the "time of contract" question, see Barrier, supra note 183.
185. The prime rate fell to 10.5% on February 28th, but increased to 11% on August 8th.
It remained at this rate for the rest of the year.
186. Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 21, 1983, at BI, col. 5.
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pending bill that would abolish all state interest rate maximums, leaving the rate to fluctuate with market conditions." 7 This usury provision was part of a comprehensive banking deregulation bill sponsored
by Senator Jake Garn. 8 1 Under this measure, interest limits on business and agricultural loans would be set at 5% over the three year
rate on treasury bills. Tying the maximum rate to the treasury bill
rate reflected an awareness of the fact that the Federal Reserve discount rate was not "market sensitive" and, thus, not an appropriate
rate to use in a usury provision. This usury provision was to override
all state imposed interest rate ceilings for three years, although states
could reimpose their rate limits during this time if they so desired.
Bankers in Arkansas supported this new federal override because
they felt that the "market insensitivity" of the discount rate would, if
rates were to rise any further, produce problems similar to those they
had experienced in the past. They feared that with higher rates, Arkansas would again experience credit rationing and an outflow of
funds to other states, the two major problems that had plagued the
state in the years before Amendment 60. They also feared that if the
banking system were deregulated any further, and if rates on deposits
were allowed to rise, they would be caught in a profit squeeze if the
rate they could charge (which was tied to the discount rate) did not
reflect market conditions. Thus, the support for yet another federal
override came about partly as a result of the Bishop decision and
partly as a result of the realization that the discount rate would not
provide the flexibility needed by the business and financial
community.
The Senate overwhelmingly approved Senate Bill 2851 on September 13, 1984, by a 89-5 vote.'1 9 Senators Pryor and Bumpers
voted against the bill because of the usury provision. 9 ° Bumpers was
against the bill because he felt that it was not right for the federal
government to override something (Amendment 60) that the people
of Arkansas had just voted in. Pryor, on the other hand, felt that a
new federal override would increase interest rates for businessmen
and farmers, whom he felt were already struggling. Despite easy Senate passage of this bill, Garn's House counterpart, Fernand St.
Germain, opposed bank deregulation and promoted his own bill that
would merely close certain legal loopholes that had been available to
187.
188.
189.
190.

Arkansas Gazette, Jan. 26, 1984, at Al, col. 5.
S. 2830, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 Cong. Rec. S11162 (1984).
Id.
Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 23, 1984, at A8, col. 1.

732

UALR LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12:695

the banking system.' 9 ' Because of differences between the House and
Senate over banking reforms that could not be resolved, the efforts to
pass a major bank deregulation bill in 1984 were blocked. Thus, Senate Bill 2851, along with its usury provision on which the Arkansas
financial community had pinned its hopes to get around the dictates
of Amendment 60, died a quiet death in the 98th Congress.
Despite the failure of Congress to pass a new usury override provision, the business and financial community in the state during 1984
was not facing the same critical problems that it had faced in the
years before passage of Amendment 60. During 1984 the prime rate
fluctuated between 10.75% and 13%, whereas the discount rate varied between 8.5% and 9%. Thus, as a result of Amendment 60,
banks and retailers were able to charge between 13.5% and 14% on
loans. The difference between the maximum rate and the prime rate,
while less than the business and financial community would have
wanted, was nevertheless much greater than the rate that would have
existed in the absence of Amendment 60. Thus, despite its defects,
Amendment 60, with its floating ceiling, was an improvement over
the old constitutional limit of 10% and provided at least some relief to
the business and financial community in the state.
The years 1985 and 1986 saw a continuation of the trend toward
lower interest rates. The prime rate began 1985 at 10.5% and declined throughout the year. By December 1985 the rate had fallen to
9.5%. The rate continued to decline throughout 1986 and ended the
year at 7.5%. Although the discount rate declined throughout this
period also, the spread between the maximum rate and the prime rate
was usually in the vicinity of three percentage points.' 92 This reduced
the pressure to alter Amendment 60, and these years were relatively
quiet in that respect. However, by early 1987 it became clear that the
downward trend in interest rates had been reversed. Interest rates
generally rose throughout the year, with the prime rate ending the
year one percentage point higher (8.75%) than the beginning of the
year. As interest rates rose during 1987, proposals to revise the usury
amendment to the constitution began to reappear. 193 Also, talk about
Amendment 60's harmful effects on the state's economy also became
more frequent. "
Interest rates continued to climb throughout 1988, with the
191. 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 40 Cong. Q. 12 (1984).
192. The discount rate was 8% at the beginning of 1985 and had fallen to 5.5% by the end
of 1986.
193. Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 10, 1987, at Cl, col. 5.
194. Arkansas Gazette, Dec. 13, 1987, at C3, col. 5.
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prime rate starting the year at 8.5% and ending the year two percentage points higher. As rates rose, the discount rate lagged behind the
market rate, with the result that Arkansas began to experience some
of the same problems it faced when the old 10% limit was in effect.
For example, by the end of 1988, the maximum rate under Amendment 60 was only one percentage point higher than the prime rate
which produced yet another "interest rate squeeze" within the state.
The effects were predictable. Loanable funds began to flow to other
states and credit rationing began to reappear. As a result of this pressure, the financial community began yet another effort to change the
state's usury law. 1 This effort took the form of drafting a new usury
amendment to the constitution that would be presented to the 1989
legislative session for referral to the voters.
The year 1989 began with a prime rate of 10.5% and a discount
rate of 6.5%, making the maximum rate on loans, under Amendment
60, 11.5%. The prime rate increased to 11.5% on February 24th but
was back down to 11% by the beginning of June. Meanwhile, the
discount rate was increased to 7% in February of the year.
By the beginning of 1989, efforts by a coalition of lenders were
96
well under way to change the state's constitutional interest limit.'
Although there were differences of opinion as to how best to accomplish the goal of revising Amendment 60, two areas of clear agreement quickly emerged. First, any new proposal would have a
maximum (nonfloating) 17% rate on consumer loans. Second, the
interest rate on general loans should be tied to a competitive interest
rate and not the discount rate. The main area of disagreement within
the coalition centered on the index to which the interest rate on general loans should be tied. The coalition, which included the Arkansas
Bankers Association, wanted the interest rate on general loans to be
set at 5% over the one year treasury bill rate. However, the Arkansas
Association of Bank Holding Companies (AABHC), one of the coalition members, wanted the maximum rate on general loans to be 5%
over the prime rate. The AABHC argued that the prime rate was a
better indicator of the price that banks actually pay for the money
that they lend. 97 The Association contended that the treasury bill
rate was the rate that the government pays for money not what the
banks pay for money.' 98 The coalition, also known as the Arkansas
195.
196.
197.
198.

Arkansas
Arkansas
Arkansas
Arkansas

Gazette,
Gazette,
Gazette,
Gazette,

Aug.
Feb.
Feb.
Feb.

6, 1988, at CI, col. 2.
2, 1989, at A6, col. 1.
7, 1989, at CI, col. 4.
21, 1989, at AS, col. 3.
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Credit Council, believed that, although the prime rate was probably a
better indicator of what banks actually pay for money, using the
prime rate might doom the chance of any changes in the usury law
because of peoples' perception that the prime rate is controlled by the
big New York City banks. Since the coalition of businessmen could
not agree on a compromise, the group asked the General Assembly to
consider two separate bills. The main difference between the two bills
was the index to which the rate on general loans would be tied. Both
would allow a maximum rate of 17% on consumer loans. Even
though the coalition of bankers and businessmen working on the
usury amendment could not agree on the index to which the rate on
general loans should be tied, the Arkansas Credit Council nevertheless endorsed both proposals and agreed to support either one. 199
Bill Becker was the leading spokesperson against the proposed
usury amendment. Becker argued that Arkansas, one of the poorest
states in the United States, could not afford the huge increase in interest rates that he predicted would occur if a new usury law were
passed. He also argued that banks and retail stores were not going
out of business in Arkansas, which, according to Becker, meant that
they were not being hurt by Amendment 60 as much as they claimed
to be.
On March 1, 1989, it was announced that the Arkansas Credit
Council and the Association of Bank Holding Companies had reached
a compromise on a proposed usury amendment. 2 °° The compromise
contained the following provisions: a) consumer loans were to carry a
17% interest rate ceiling; b) business and agricultural (general) loans
below $250,000 were to have an interest rate not to exceed five percentage points above the one-year treasury bill rate, thus, removing
the overall 17% cap on rates for general loans; and c) business loans
greater than $250,000 were to have no ceiling. An added provision
allowed for the possibility of adjustable rate loans.2 ° '
The proposed constitutional amendment, now that a compromise
had been reached, was submitted to the subcommittee of the Joint
Committee on State Agencies and Government Affairs which had
199. Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 10, 1989, at A6, col. 1.
200. Arkansas Gazette, Mar. 1, 1989, at Cl, col. 2.
201. Under the interpretation given Amendment 60, the maximum interest rate was set at
the time of the contract, making variable rate loans, where the interest rate exceeded the initial
rate, usurious. This had not been a problem for residential loans which had been exempt from
such restrictions by the DIDMCA.
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been studying the two original bills.2" 2 The full committee had to decide which of the approximately two dozen proposed constitutional
amendments to refer to the voters for their approval. 20 3 Finally, on
March 17, 1989, the legislature selected the interest rate proposal as
one of three proposed constitutional amendments to be presented to
voters in the November 1990 general election.
On November 22, 1989, the forces attempting to ease state interest rate limits began their organizational efforts by forming a committee to work for passage of the usury amendment in the November
1990 general election. 2° The organization, named "The Committee
for the 1989 Interest Rate Control Amendment," includes ten business and professional organizations, including the Arkansas Automobile Dealers Association, the Arkansas Association of Bank Holding
Companies, and the Arkansas Bankers Association. The campaign to
change the state's usury law should begin in earnest as the November
general election date approaches.
CONCLUSIONS

As this survey of Arkansas usury law shows, Arkansans have
been preoccupied with the question of an appropriate interest rate
limit for the better part of 154 years. The usury issue has not been
settled yet, despite years of lawsuits and legal maneuvering. The continuing controversy over an appropriate interest rate limit is likely to
remain an issue until Arkansans decide either to scrap the idea of
having a maximum rate altogether or to adopt a constitutional
amendment that allows the interest rate to fluctuate freely with market conditions. In addition, to avoid the massive outflow of funds that
the state has experienced in the past, any new constitutional usury
provision must be structured so that both the business and financial
communities are allowed a reasonable differential between their cost
of funds and what they can charge for those funds. Without either of
these changes, continuing efforts to keep the interest rate in the state
at artificially low levels will continue to create economic problems for
the state of the type seen in the past.
202. The subcommittee had been formed to help reach a compromise between the two
competing proposals originally submitted by the Arkansas Credit Council and the AABHC.
203. By law, the legislature is empowered to refer a maximum of three constitutional
amendments to the voters in a general election. ARK. CONST. art. XIX, § 22. The proposed
usury amendment to the constitution was only one of approximately two dozen other proposals (dealing with such matters as school desegregation and legislative pay) under consideration.
Arkansas Gazette, Mar. 1, 1989, at Cl, col. 2.
204. Arkansas Gazette, Nov. 23, 1989, at B2, col. 3.
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In looking at the history of the usury issue in Arkansas, there are
a few points worth noting. First, we have not attempted to estimate
the cost to Arkansans of the numerous attempts over the years to dealwith the usury question. However, we do not doubt that the cost,
measured not only in terms of actual dollars spent but also in terms of
time and effort, has been enormous. Numerous lawsuits, the legislature's time spent in wrestling with this question, efforts at the federal
level to override state usury laws, millions of dollars spent on campaigns, and in holding elections all represent real costs to society that
Arkansans certainly can ill afford to bear. Unfortunately, these costs
represent only part of the burden that Arkansans have had to bear as
a result of an artificially low interest rate. Other costs, in the form of
a higher unemployment rate, higher prices, and the inability of borrowers to gain access to needed funds have occurred as a result of the
restrictive nature of the state's usury law. If all these costs were converted into dollar amounts there is no doubt that the price of having
an artificially low interest rate at various times throughout the state's
history would run into the millions of dollars. All of this could have
been avoided by enacting a more realistic usury provision years ago
when it first became obvious that the 1874 constitutional provision
had become outdated. This is essentially the direction in which the
state has been moving over the last few years.
Second, it is interesting to point out that either Arkansans are
more cognizant of the need for a more reasonable usury law or else
the drafters of the successive usury amendments over the years have
grown more adept at recognizing what people in the state want. In
the 1974 general election on Amendment 57, only 13% of the voters
voted for the amendment, which would have allowed the legislature
to set the maximum rate. Six years later, in the 1980 general election,
Amendment 60, which was similar to Amendment 57, went down to
defeat by a much narrower margin. This time 45% of the voters had
voted for the new usury provision. Thus, in just six years' time, even
though Amendment 57 and Amendment 60 were similar in that both
would allow the legislature to set the maximum rate, the increase in
support for a new usury amendment was obvious. Finally, in 1982
Arkansans approved Amendment 60 by nearly 60% of the vote.
Although Amendment 60 was structured differently than the previous
two amendments, each would have had the effect of freeing the state
from the restrictive 1874 constitutional usury provision. If the trend
in approval rates holds true to form and if the prevailing interest rate
climate does not diminish the perception of a need for a revision, one
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would expect the proposed usury amendment to be approved by a
healthy margin in the 1990 general election.

